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The Long-Term Effects of Foreign Investment
on Local Human Capital: Four American
Companies in Spain, 1920s–1970s
This article explores the long-term effects of foreign direct
investment on the human capital development of host econo-
mies, based on the historical analysis of the Spanish operations
of four leading American ﬁrms: ITT, J. Walter Thompson,
Merck Sharp & Dohme, and John Deere. Our research shows
that the training and working practices of these companies
had a positive impact on the Spanish subsidiaries in terms
of technological upgrading and managerial development.
However, the local context was also relevant, through manda-
tory agreements that empowered local partners from the start
and the availability of locally educated professionals eager to
absorb new knowledge.
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Does inward foreign direct investment (FDI) promote themanagerialand entrepreneurial capabilities of host economies? International
business scholars, traditionally concerned with the driving forces and
speciﬁc advantages of multinational enterprises (MNEs), have often
pointed to the potentially positive effects of multinationals on host coun-
tries.1 MNEs are particularly good at transferring difﬁcult-to-codify
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knowledge, such as technical skills and organizational capabilities.2
Given the fact that this knowledge is not properly captured by quantita-
tive analysis, research on international human resource management
enriches the debate by focusing on stafﬁng strategies and expatriate
knowledge transfer (at both the organizational and individual level).3
But evidence is not conclusive anyway, as the impact of MNEs on host
economies depends largely on the characteristics of the host economy
and varies across speciﬁc industries and ﬁrms.4 There is, as a result, a
growing demand for contextualization and empirical research at the
industry and ﬁrm levels.5
(Washington, D.C., 2005); Eduardo Borensztein, José De Gregorio, and Jong-Wha Lee, “How
Does Foreign Investment Affect Economic Growth?” Journal of International Economics 45
(1998): 115–35.
2 Peter Buckley and Mark Casson, The Future of the Multinational Enterprise (London,
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Enterprises from Emerging Economies: A Business History Perspective,” Business History
Review 89, no. 3 (2015): 415–45.
3David G. Collings and Hugh Scullion, “Global Stafﬁng,” International Journal of Human
Resource Management 20, no. 6 (2009): 1249–52.
4 John H. Dunning and Sarianna Lundan, Multinational Enterprises and the Global
Economy (London, 2008), 444–47; Geoffrey Jones, Multinationals and Global Capitalism
from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Century (Oxford, 2005), 260–66; Dirk Willem te
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paper, Overseas Development Institute, 30 Jan. 2016), 15–17; Geoffrey Jones, “Firms and
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200; Geoffrey Jones “Editor’s Introduction,” Business History Review 89, no. 3 (2015): 403–
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Review 84, no. 4 (2010): 638–45; Gary Oddou, Joyce S. Osland, and Roger N. Blakeney,
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tional Business Studies 40, no. 2 (2009): 181–99.
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The multifaceted, and often indirect, effects of FDI and the subse-
quent need for contextualization have long been recognized by business
historians, who have also shown the advantages of long-term horizon
studies. In the early 1970s, Mira Wilkins established that effective
diffusion of technology required that “effective business organizations”
were eager and prepared to absorb that technology.6 This process of
diffusion and absorption of technology, and knowledge, is also
determined by other variables, according to later research, such as the
host economy’s stock of human capital (for example, individuals’
knowledge, skills, and competencies) and corporate decisions about
the entry mode of the foreign multinational and the ownership structure
of its subsidiary—decisions that are in turn inﬂuenced by the host insti-
tutional and economic context.7 Not surprisingly, MNEs seem to have
contributed more to knowledge transfer within advanced economies
than to knowledge transfer from advanced to developing countries,
where they have tended to reinforce, rather than transform, existing
institutions. Putting aside the so-called demonstration effect in sectors
such as the motor and machinery industries, MNEs tended to operate
as enclaves with little effect on the host economy in terms of knowledge
transfer and human capital development. So in spite of the efforts of
some Western ﬁrms to train local staff and transfer business models,
human resource management has consisted mainly of expatriation pol-
icies based on an ethnocentric perspective—that is, key positions in the
organization are ﬁlled by employees from the parent company to
ensure control or in the absence of host-country qualiﬁed executives,
among other reasons. Overall, multinationals have only moved to poly-
centric stafﬁng at the subsidiary level (including the appointment of
host nationals for management positions) pushed by local governments,
usually after decolonization, in cases of increasingly scarce expatriate
staff.8
Context—Expanding Perspectives on the Expatriate Situation,” Journal of Global Mobility 4,
no. 4 (2016): 382–85.
6MiraWilkins, “The Role of Private Business in the International Diffusion of Technology,”
Journal of Economic History 34, no. 1 (1974): 166–88.
7 Jones,Multinationals and Global Capitalism, 260–61; Geoffrey Jones, “Business History
and the Impact of MNEs on Host Economies” in Jean J. Boddewyn, ed., Multidisciplinary
Insights from New AIB Fellows, Research in Global Strategic Management series, vol. 16
(Bingley, 2014), 177–98.
8Geoffrey Jones, Entrepreneurship and Multinationals: Global Business and the Making
of the Modern World (Cheltenham, 2013), 37, 131–32; Stephanie Decker, “Building Up
Goodwill: British Business, Development and Economic Nationalism in Ghana and Nigeria,
1945–1977,” Enterprise & Society 9, no. 4 (2008): 602–13, https://doi.org/10.1017/
S1467222700007540; Daniel R. Headrik, The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer
in the Age of Imperialism (Oxford, 1988); Caroline Piquet, “The Suez Company’s Concession
in Egypt, 1854–1956:Modern Infrastructure and Local Economic Development,” Enterprise &
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In this article we explore the long-term effects of FDI on local human
capital, making use of a business history approach and of multiple-case
analysis. We deﬁne human capital narrowly, as we are interested in the
knowledge, skills, and competencies embodied in managerial and tech-
nical professionals (as further developed later, from engineers to mar-
keting professionals and plant managers), which are at the core of the
modern business enterprise. Focusing on four American subsidiaries
in twentieth-century Spain, we aim to assess the role played in knowl-
edge dissemination both by local-context variables and by corporate
decisions on entry mode, and on stafﬁng and training strategies. In
selecting the local-context variables we follow Klaus E. Meyer, Ram
Mudambi, and Rajneesh Narula, who distinguish two dimensions of
local context: institutional framework (in our study, laws shaping FDI)
and resource endowment (in our study, existing human capital).9 Our
choice of corporate-decision variables relies on the historiography men-
tioned above. Regarding stafﬁng and training policies, our analysis is
based on a sample of 120 top ofﬁcers, or 27 percent of an estimated
total of 445. We draw on corporate and national archives in Spain and
the United States, as well as interviews, for the empirical study.
Our choice of host and home countries, and of case studies, deserves
an explanation as well. First, we focus on twentieth-century Spain as an
example of a Western middle-income, but highly technologically depen-
dent, host economy. Notwithstanding remarkable advances in terms of
entrepreneurship and technical education since at least the mid-
nineteenth century, Spain did not complete its industrialization and
reach Western socioeconomic levels until the 1970s.10 From the 1920s,
when the earliest of the companies studied here initially entered
Spain, to the late 1970s, when this story ends, Spain experienced civil
war (1936–1939), then stagnation and isolation in the 1940s, and recov-
ery in the following decades thanks to help from the United States in
the 1950s and increasing liberalization in the 1960s.11 Institutional
modernization—in terms, for instance, of the tax system and the liberal-
ization of commodity and capital markets—did not conform to Western
European “standards” until the end of Franco’s dictatorship in 1975. The
reforms undertook then put an end to the economic nationalism that had
Society 5, no. 1 (2004): 107–27; Keetie Sluyterman, “Decolonisation and the Organisation of
the International Workforce: Dutch Multinationals in Indonesia, 1945–1967,” Business
History (advance online publication 17 July 2017), https://doi.org/10.1080/00076791.2017.
1350170; Kristin Ranestad, “Multinational Mining Companies, Employment and Knowledge
Transfer: Chile and Norway from ca. 1870 to 1940,” Business History (advance online publi-
cation 6 Dec. 2017), https://doi.org/10.1080/00076791.2017.1407313.
9Meyer, Mudambi, and Narula, “Multinational Enterprises and Local Contexts.”
10 Leandro Prados, Spanish Economic Growth, 1850–2015 (London, 2017), 40–43.
11 Gabriel Tortella, The Development of Modern Spain (Cambridge, Mass., 2000).
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prevailed in the country since the 1920s, reaching its peak during the
autarkic period of the 1940s. Growth and institutional change acceler-
ated with Spain’s entrance into the European Economic Community
(EEC) in 1986. While Spain was among the poorest countries within
the EEC at the time of its entry, it was an industrialized nation. In the
years that followed EEC membership, Spanish literacy rates, among
other educational variables, converged with the Western European
average.
Spanish modernization relied heavily on foreign investment and
technology.12 While the literature has traditionally attributed this tech-
nological dependence to the shortage of domestic entrepreneurship,
recent scholarship has highlighted the overwhelming capacity demon-
strated by Spanish ﬁrms to learn from foreign corporations.13 This capac-
ity to absorb foreign knowledge would contribute to the creation of
competitive advantage.14 Foreign ﬁrms chose to cooperate with local
companies not only to overcome their lack of knowledge of the domestic
market and overall liability of foreignness, but also to accommodate
Spain’s economic nationalism and the resultant dominance of local busi-
ness groups.15 So, greenﬁeld investment shaped the early history of U.S.
FDI in Spain, as in other countries, because of the scarcity of local part-
ners in the new high-tech industries related to the Second Industrial
Revolution.16 But, joint ventures formally or informally controlled by
the U.S. partner were the dominant entry mode for large industrial
enterprises in themid-1960s. This set a quite unique pattern in the Euro-
pean context and makes MNEs’ entry-mode strategy a variable that
deserves our attention, by examining how the local context shapes corpo-
rate decisions.17
12 Juan Muñoz, Santiago Roldán, and Ángel Serrano, La internacionalización del capital
en España, 1959–1977 (Madrid, 1978).
13 Particularly in small and medium enterprises, technical assistance contracts, manufac-
turing licenses, and hiring foreign technicians, among others, were powerful sources of knowl-
edge. Nuria Puig and Adoración Álvaro-Moya, “The Long-Term Impact of Foreign
Multinational Enterprises in Spain: New Insights into an Old Topic,” Journal of Evolutionary
Studies in Business 1, no. 2 (2016): 14–39; JesúsM. Valdaliso, “Accounting for the Resilience of
the Machine-Tool Industry in Spain (c. 1960–2015),” Business History (advance online pub-
lication 20 July 2018), https://doi.org/10.1080/00076791.2018.1473380.
14Mauro F. Guillén, The Rise of Spanish Multinationals: European Business in the Global
Economy (Cambridge, Mass., 2011).
15Nuria Puig and Adoración Álvaro-Moya, “La huella del capital extranjero en España: un
análisis comparado,” Revista de Historia Industrial 58 (2015): 249–85.
16 Jones, Multinationals and Global Capitalism, 260.
17 James Vaupel and Joan P. Curhan, The Making of Multinational Enterprise: A Source-
book of Tables Based on a Study of 187 Major U.S. Manufacturing Corporations (Boston,
1969), 384–85; Andrea Colli, “Multinationals and Economic Development in Italy during
the Twentieth Century,” Business History Review 88, no. 2 (2014): 303–27; Hubert Bonin,
“American Business Spreading Modernity into France,” in American Firms in Europe
(1880–1980): Strategy, Identity, Perception and Performance, ed. Hubert Bonin and Ferry
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Second, we analyze the operations of four leading U.S. companies in
the country. Since our focus is on the host market, our choice of compa-
nies allows us to offset potential home-country effects of MNEs’ recruit-
ing and training practices. Note that Anglo-American companies tend to
rely more on the market and the existing skills of newly recruited man-
agers than on the on-the-job training characteristic of continental Euro-
pean and Japanese ﬁrms.18 The United States has consistently ranked
among the four largest foreign investors and trade partners of modern
Spain.19 American ﬁrms became hegemonic in the middle decades of
the twentieth century, representing 40 percent of total foreign invest-
ment and 25 percent of Spain’s capital stock in the 1960s.20
Third, to separate industry-speciﬁc variables affecting knowledge
transfer from the inﬂuence exerted by the local context, we carry out a
multiple-case analysis that comprises both manufacturing and service
industries (chemicals, farm machinery, telecommunications, and adver-
tising) in which American investment was highly concentrated in the
case of Spain.21 The four American ﬁrms selected—International Tele-
phone and Telegraph (ITT), J. Walter Thompson (JWT), Merck Sharp
& Dohme (MSD), and John Deere (JD)—were global leaders and were
positioned at the technological frontier during the period analyzed
here. Moreover, all four reached prominent positions in the Spanish
market, contributed to the formation of domestic staff, and developed
a lasting relationship with the host economy (see Table 1).
The period of study varies across the case studies—depending on
when each multinational settled in Spain and the duration of its inﬂu-
ence on the local subsidiaries—but does not extend either before the
ﬁrst important wave of U.S. investment in the 1920s or beyond the struc-
tural reforms of the late 1970s. The location of their headquarters,
mainly in Madrid, warrants further explanation. Not only was Madrid
the political and administrative capital of Spain, but Franco’s govern-
ment explicitly encouraged the economic development of the Madrid
region over that of the historical industrial districts of Catalonia and
the Basque Country.22 American companies were particularly responsive
de Goey (Geneva, 2009), 550–57; and Ferry de Goey and BenWubs, “USMultinationals in the
Netherlands in the Twentieth Century: ‘The Open Gate to Europe,’” in Bonin and de Goey,
American Firms in Europe, 163–65.
18Dunning and Lundan, Multinational Enterprises, 449.
19 Puig and Álvaro-Moya “The Long-Term Impact,” 16–17.
20Muñoz, Roldán, and Serrano, La internacionalización, 130.
21 Adoración Álvaro-Moya, “Hízose el milagro. La inversión directa estadounidense y la
empresa española (c. 1900–1975),” Investigaciones de Historia Económica 7, no. 3 (2011),
364–65.
22 Tortella, The Development, chap. 12.
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to this scenario, and most relevant subsidiaries were located in
Madrid.23
In the following sections, we present our case studies. After a brief
overview of these companies’ operations in Spain, we focus on their
hiring and training practices to see how they were inﬂuenced by the
Table 1
Overview of Four U.S. Companies’ Operations in Spain,
1924–1970
U.S. Company
[industry]
Years Entry Mode and Ownership Structure
ITT
[telecommunications]
1924–1945
1945
1945–1970s
Subsidiaries (Telefónica and SESA) with Urquijo
Group and other Spanish minority shareholders
Nationalization of Telefónica
Technical cooperation and supplier agreements
ITT-Telefónica
J. W. Thompson (JWT)
[advertising]
1927–1931
1931–1935
1949–1963
1963–1966
1966–1980
Full subsidiary (JWT Spain)
Loose cooperation JWT and Thomson Publicidad
Cooperation agreement JWT and Ruescas
Joint venture JWT and Alas
Full subsidiary (JWT Spain)
Merck Sharp & Dohme
(MSD)
[pharmaceuticals]
1949–1978
1954–1978
1957
1968–1978
1978
License and manufacturing agreement Merck &
Co., (MSD after 1953) and Spanish ﬁrm CEPA
(controlled by Urquijo Group)
Research agreement MSD and CEPA to create
joint R&D center
Distribution agreement MSD-CEPA
Full commercial subsidiary (MSD Spain)
Clinical research unit and cooperation MSD and
Spanish scientiﬁc institutions
Full manufacturing subsidiary (MSD Spain) and
acquisition of R&D center
John Deere (JD)
[agricultural
machinery]
1956–1961
1961–1967
1970
Manufacturing joint venture (Lanz Ibérica, John
Deere Lanz since 1959; JD and Medem family and
Spanish banks)
Commercial joint venture (JD andMedem family)
JD’s full manufacturing and commercial subsidi-
ary after subsequent capital share increases
(John Deere Ibérica)
Source: Authors’ compilation.
23 Almost 36 percent of the stock of inward FDI between 1960 and 1972was concentrated in
Madrid, followed by Catalonia (26 percent); within Catalonia, investment was concentrated in
Barcelona and its surrounding towns. Muñoz, Roldán, and Serrano, La internacionalización,
131–33.
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availability of managers and professional personnel as well as educa-
tional institutions that acted as recruitment pools; to assess which
direct and indirect effects resulted in terms of knowledge transfer
within and beyond subsidiaries; and to analyze how this process was
shaped by the multinationals’ entry strategies and economic policies.
Here, contrary to cases of subsidiaries in many colonial settings, the
nationality of local employees is not determinant.
International Telephone and Telegraph, 1924–1970s
ITT was one of the largest telecom groups of the twentieth century.
Founded in 1920 as a small Caribbean operator, and a typical example of
a freestanding ﬁrm, ITT was by the end of that decade a top-tier global
communication conglomerate.24 This transformation was possible
thanks to two interrelated strategic decisions: the creation of the
Spanish Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España (hereafter, Telefón-
ica) in 1924 and, one year later, the acquisition of the telephone equip-
ment manufacturer International Western Electric, the international
subsidiary of Western Electric (outside the United States and Canada),
which was renamed International Standard Electric (ISE).25
Telefónica was the ﬁrst large-scale foreign investment of ITT. It was
founded in 1924 to bid for the Spanish telephone network monopoly,
which the company was granted after a few months Both the terms of
the contract signed with the Spanish government in 1924 and the logis-
tics of the work itself necessitated having suppliers in the country. ITT
thus sought potential suppliers, which led to acquisition of the
company later known as ISE. Consequently, ITT then became and was,
until the nationalization of Telefónica in 1945, the largest American
investor in Spain.26 Since 1924, all ITT subsidiaries in the country ulti-
mately revolved around Telefónica, including a new ISE manufacturing
plant and minor investments in radio and ﬁnance (see Table 1).
24 Tetsuo Abo, “ITT’s International Business Activities, 1920–40: The Remarkable
Advance and Setback of a ‘Pure International Utility Company,’” in The Growth of Multina-
tionals, ed. Mira Wilkins (Aldershot, 1991), 512–36; Dwayne R. Winseck and Robert
M. Pike, Communication and Empire: Media, Markets, and Globalization, 1860–1930
(Durham, 2007), 303–18.
25Maurice Deloraine, When Telecom and ITT Were Young (New York, 1974). Western
Electric was integrated into AT&T, which held the monopoly on phone service in the United
States and Canada for most of the twentieth century. In 1925, AT&T sold International
Western Electric to avoid U.S. antitrust legislation. Mira Wilkins, The Maturing of Multina-
tional Enterprise: American Business Abroad from 1914 to 1970 (Cambridge, Mass., 1974),
70–71.
26 Álvaro-Moya, “Hízose el milagro,” 360.
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ITT’s success relied largely on the network of contacts—local politi-
cians, engineers, and business groups—that it had developed.27 Themost
lasting and fruitful relationship was with Urquijo Group, Spain’s largest
private industrial group formost of the twentieth century and by the time
Telefónica was founded also connected with international corporations
in the electric industry.28 Although Urquijo Group possessed only sym-
bolic participation capital in Telefónica (less than 1 percent), it occupied
several positions on the Board, including the presidency and it was
instrumental in allowing ITT to preserve its interests in the country
despite various nationalistic threats from the government and a civil war.
In 1924, the Spanish telephone service was poor and expensive. ITT
absorbed the existing local operators, developed a truly national
network, expanded the organizational structure with new departments
and regional units, and reinforced control through protocols and opera-
tional routines.29 The modernization of Telefónica and the national
telecom network required a large and trained staff that the young ITT
did not have yet. However, recruiting new people was difﬁcult because
telecommunication studies was quite a young ﬁeld in Spain—the ﬁrst
degree in telecommunications was granted in 1920.30 This was one
reason ITT pushed in-house training of local employees. Another was
that the contract signed in 1924 between Telefónica and the government
stipulated that at least 80 percent of the staff had to be local, a require-
ment that was subsequently applied to ISE’s Spanish subsidiary (SESA)
as well. The information available shows that this commitment was
quickly fulﬁlled. From 1924 to 1928, of the 7,600 employees working
for Telefónica, 250 were Americans.31 In 1932, apart from the ﬁve ITT
representatives on the ﬁrm’s board of directors and top managers in
four departments (auditing, construction andmaintenance, engineering,
and sales), there were only thirteen foreigners on the staff, working in the
27Adoración Álvaro-Moya, “Networking Capability Building in the Multinational Enter-
prise: ITT and the Spanish Adventure (1924–1945),” Business History 57, no. 7 (2015):
1082–111.
28William Hausman, Peter Hertner, and Mira Wilkins, Global Electriﬁcation: Multina-
tional Enterprise and International Finance in the History of Light and Power, 1878–2007
(New York, 2008), 135–36, 349n91; Núria Puig and Eugenio Torres, Banco Urquijo: Un
banco con historia (Madrid, 2008).
29 Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España (CTNE), La nueva red telefónica de España
(Madrid, 1928); Robert Sobel, ITT: The Management of Opportunity (Washington, D.C.,
2000), chap. 3; Ángel A. Calvo,Historia de Telefónica: 1924–1975: Primeras décadas: tecno-
logía, economía y política (Barcelona, 2010), chap. 3; Deloraine, Telecom and ITT.
30 “Escuela General de Telegrafía (1913–1929),” Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingenieros de
Telecomunicación, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid (former Ofﬁcial School of Telegraphy),
accessed 13 Feb. 2017, http://www.etsit.upm.es/escuela/historia/escuela-general-de-
telegraﬁa-1913-1929.html.
31 “ITT’s Memorandum 26 February 1940,” R1671/6, Archivo Histórico del Ministerio de
Asuntos Exteriores [Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Madrid, Spain.
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construction andmaintenance, sales, and engineering departments.32 In
the case of the Spanish subsidiary of ISE, however, all senior ofﬁcials
were foreigners, either Americans or executives from other European
subsidiaries.33
The training of local staff initially relied on ITT’s engineers, accoun-
tants, and managers, as well as ITT-recruited experts from AT&T.34 But
soon Spaniards became the instructors. All formal personnel training
was channeled through the Escuela de Telefonía (Telephone School),
founded in 1925 and since 1926, the company’s training department.35
Most of the courses offered were also offered at ISE’s Spanish branch
and were aimed at shop-ﬂoor workers, middle managers, and ofﬁce
employees.36
No great changes took place inmanagement positions after Telefóni-
ca’s nationalization in 1945. By that time only four American executives
still played key roles: the executive vice president, general director of the
operations departments (auditing, construction and maintenance, engi-
neering, and sales), chief executive of the auditing department, and
assistant manager of construction and maintenance.37 Indeed, by
virtue of the nationalization agreement, Telefónica would sign two con-
tracts with ITT for its technical advice and equipment. ISE’s Spanish
branch, controlled by ITT until its acquisition by France’s Alcatel in
the early 1980s, was Telefónica’s exclusive supplier until the 1960s.38
The historical record shows that the role played by ITT executives in Tele-
fónica began to diminish in the late 1950s, in favor of the local managers
they had trained and collaborated with throughout their professional
lives.39 The 1950 and 1955 work plans were both designed entirely by
Spanish engineers and in 1955 for the ﬁrst time without ITT’s advice.
But even before 1950, Spanish engineers had developed many of the
ﬁrst projects to expand telephone service in the country.
Our sample of topmanagers in Telefónica includes 110 professionals
who worked in the company between 1924 and 1963, of which we studied
around 60 directors. But to delve deeper into the relationship between
FDI and local technical employees, we reconstructed the professional
32Minutes of the Executive Committee 406, 28 Sept. 1932, Archivo Telefónica [Telefónica’s
Archives], Madrid, Spain (hereafter AT).
33Manuel Márquez, Manuel Márquez Mira: hombre de empresa (Madrid, 1976), 149.
34Deloraine, Telecom and ITT, 67.
35 Revista Telefónica Española [Spanish Telephone Review, Telefónica’s corporate
journal], Jan. 1925 and Sept. 1926; Telefónica, 1926 Annual Report, AT.
36 Ángel A. Calvo, Telecomunicaciones y el nuevomundo digital en España. La aportación
de Standard Eléctrica (Barcelona, 2014), 76.
37 “II Reunión de Jefes Técnicos,” July 1945, Fundación Telefónica Archives [Telefónica
Foundation Archives], Madrid, Spain.
38 Calvo, Telecomunicaciones, chap. 3.
39Minutes of the Board of Directors and of the Executive Committee (1924–1980), AT.
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careers of top managers in the engineering, sales, and auditing depart-
ments, between 1924 and ITT’s nationalization, a total of eight
people.40 Of these top managers, six were engineers and two were archi-
tects, all with degrees from Spanish universities. They had joined Tele-
fónica, most of them in the 1920s, to work ﬁrst under the supervision
of ITT’s executives and engineers, and they had dedicated their entire
professional careers to the telecommunication ﬁrm. Furthermore,
these professionals, in particular José María Clara Corellano and
Manuel Marín Bonell, became regular collaborators with local training
institutions, were very active in national and international scientiﬁc
forums, and some of their publications were used to train ITT’s staff
worldwide. Although beyond the scope of this study, Telefónica’s engi-
neering department was the seed, in the late 1960s, of Telefónica’s R&D
center. A similar institution was promoted at ISE’s Spanish branch.41
The case of ITT illustrates the challenges in terms of capital and
human resource management that characterize young multinationals.
While other studies have examined ITT training practices for telephone
operators, here we have looked at top management and technical posi-
tions.42 The polycentric stafﬁng strategy followed by ITT might be a
response to this ﬁrm’s accelerated internationalization, but a response
also to a local context characterized by an industry restructuring in a reg-
ulated sector (telecommunications until very recently), an industry stra-
tegic for the country’s growth (and target of nationalist groups because of
it), and an industry experiencing very fast technological change. Having
highly skilled and trained locals was key to adapting to both international
and national forces.
J. Walter Thompson, 1927–1980
Advertising agencies were fundamental in the internationalization
of American ﬁrms, systematically exploring foreign markets and using
advanced methods to inﬂuence local consumer behavior. Between the
late 1920s, when JWT arrived in Europe and paved the way for
General Motors (GM), and the 1980s, when it sold out to the British
40 Ibid.; Francisco J. García Algarra, “Centrales telefónicas norteamericanas en los años
20: Estudio de la formación de una tipología arquitectónica” (PhD diss., Universidad Nacional
a Distancia, 2005), 307–10; Asociación Española de Ingenieros de Telecomunicación (AEIT),
Relación de los ingenieros; AEIT, Boletín (Madrid, 1941); Alfredo Marín Camacho, “Manuel
Marín Bonell,” in Cuatrocientos años de los Marín, ed. Alfredo Marín (Valencia, 2009),
137–51; Ayuntamiento de Morella, “Fondo Manuel Marín,” accessed 13 Feb. 2017, http://
www.morella.net/museu/arxiu/?lang=es.
41 Calvo, Telecomunicaciones, 135, 305–6.
42 Cristina Borderías, Entre líneas: Trabajo e identidad femenina en la España Contem-
poránea. La Compañía Telefónica, 1924–1980 (Barcelona, 1993).
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media group WPP, this leading agency dramatically changed European
marketing and advertising. JWT did so by introducing a scientiﬁc
approach that reshaped markets and the advertising profession alike.
JWT’s clients were high-proﬁle U.S. manufacturers of consumer goods
willing to pay up to 20 percent of their net sales in exchange for a
complex service. Over time, the agency learned to work with local
ﬁrms and institutions as well. JWTwould become Spain’s top advertising
agency between 1975 and 1987, as well as a training ground for profes-
sional advertisers.43 Although most of the agency’s clients were Ameri-
can multinationals, in the 1970s the number of Spanish clients was
increasing.
The story of JWT Spain is all but straightforward.44 Like most of
JWT’s European subsidiaries, it started as a full subsidiary, led by U.S.
managers and supervised closely by the New York headquarters. Bad
timing, founded on the eve of the Great Depression and GM’s collapse,
and a too-American approach to the diversity and complexity of Euro-
pean markets put an abrupt end to JWT’s ﬁrst attempt at international-
ization in 1935. The agency would return to the Spanish market in 1949,
ﬁrst in cooperation with local agencies and then from 1966 on as a full
subsidiary (see Table 1).
Arthur Hartzell, an American, was JWT’s ﬁrst director in Spain,
from 1927 to 1932. According to a report he presented in New York in
the summer of 1930, the Spanish ofﬁce spent its ﬁrst six months doing
research and collecting statistics on Spain and the Spanish market for
automobiles, trucks, and electrical appliances.45 Hartzell was particu-
larly interested in Spain’s potential market for GM, Westinghouse, and
other American multinationals. He was ambivalent about the country,
however. On the one hand, he saw it as primarily rural, with low purchas-
ing power, extremely low literacy rates, low newspaper circulation rates,
and many other idiosyncrasies in comparison with other European
nations. Therefore, he advised simplifying and adapting ready-made
43 Julián Bravo, J. Walter Thompson en España de 1927 a 1936 (Madrid, 1978).
44 This case study relies on documents from the J. Walter Thompson archives at the John
W. Hartman Center for Sales, Advertising & Marketing History, Rubenstein Library, Duke
University, Durham (hereafter JWTA); J. Walter Thompson (JWT), J. Walter Thompson
España: 25 años (Madrid, 1991); JWT España, Tenemos diez años (Madrid, 1976); JWT
España, El mercado y nuestros anuncios (Madrid, 1984); and JWT España, JWT 25: Esto
no es un cuchillo de palo (Madrid, 1991). This study also utilizes interviews with Julián
Bravo (JWT Spain: director, 1966–1992; CEO, 1974–1988; executive president, 1988–
1992), Ramón Perales (JWT Spain, top executive), and M. Rosa Pesquera (JWT Spain, top
executive); all interviews by Núria Puig, 2004 and 2005, JWT España, Madrid. We have not
yet examined two new resources at Duke University’s Hartman Center—Edward G. Wilson
papers and Rena Bartos papers—both of which hold information about JWT Spain.
45Representatives’ Meetings, 29 July 1930, JWTA; Research Reports, Spain 1927–1930,
JWTA.
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advertisements from New York to ﬁt the Spanish market. On the other
hand, Spain was a promising and relatively easy market for some con-
sumer goods, and foreign advertising was highly regarded. JWT had
“an enviable reputation for fair dealing, conscientious work, prompt
payment and high charges.”46 The large fees it demanded (17.65
percent of net sales compared to 1 to 5 percent by Swiss, German, and
Spanish agencies) were indeed a problem.
In New York, Hartzell continued to advocate adaptation, arguing
that “our future depends upon the growth of our local business and
the development of our personnel to the point where we are known as
an authority on advertising.”47 He observed that “what we have to
bring is the vast experience of the JWT company in advertising which
can be applied to these problems of the country because when all is
said and done, the advertising problems are the same whether in the
US or Europe; it is the methods of solving those problems that are differ-
ent because no two markets have been developed to an equal point.”48
His vision was proved to be right thirty years later. Despite Hartzell’s
doubts, JWT’s Spanish subsidiary did comparatively well in terms of
sales and proﬁtability.49 The American agency was associated with ratio-
nal advertising based on consumer research and reading habits and
media analysis. The organization of the Spanish ofﬁce was a small
replica of the standard foreign ofﬁce, with a neat division of labor
among departments, a rarity in a trade where everyone was expected
to do everything. Under the supervision of a British artistic director,
most of the artwork was developed outside the subsidiary.
In 1931 GM, hit by the Great Depression, decided to retreat from
most European markets—Spain included—and closed its account with
JWT. Hartzell returned to New York and JWT Spain moved its ofﬁce
from Madrid to Barcelona, where most of its remaining clients were,
and hired Malcolm Thomson, who was British, to run it. Under a new
name, Thomson Publicidad, and a loose relationship with JWT, the
agency developed its own methods and projects until 1935, when
Thomson moved to Veritas, a dynamic agency established years earlier
by a group of leading Spanish manufacturers of consumer goods.50
Veritas’s refusal to merge and the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in
1936 accelerated the end of Thomson’s agency.
46Representatives’ Meetings, 29 July 1930, JWTA.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 In 1928, it represented 4.5 percent of JWT’s European business and 7.1 percent of GM’s
European sales. Proﬁtability was higher than the average (6.8 percent versus 5.5 percent) and
labor costs remained relatively low (57.2 percent of total costs). Research Reports, Spain 1927–
1930, JWTA.
50Bravo, J. Walter Thompson; interview with Julián Bravo.
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The dramatic fall of Spanish consumption levels during the long
postwar period created a gloomy scenario in Spain. However, the fact
that Pan American World Airways, Ford, and other prominent JWT
clients continued to operate in the country led the company to return
to Spain in 1949 and seek a local partner: Ruescas.51 Its founder,
Francisco García Ruescas, had studied economics and marketing in
London and worked for the Spanish agencies Dardo and Alas from 1941
to 1949.52 Upon returning from a fruitful stay in the United States, he
founded Ruescas and became a passionate educator and a key person
in the emerging institutional infrastructure of Spanish advertising. This
infrastructure included a school of marketing and advertising and a
nationwide association of large advertising clients. When negotiations
to consolidate the collaboration agreement between JWT and Ruescas
failed, Ruescas associated with McCann-Erickson while JWT turned to
Spain’s leading agency, Alas, to establish a joint venture that lasted
until 1966. In accordance with Spanish law, the Spaniards possessed
most of the share capital (51 percent) in this venture.
The fast-growing Spanish market, its abundance of creative talent,
and an ever-friendlier legal framework for foreign companies led JWT
to establish a full subsidiary, JWT España, in 1966, with Manuel
Eléxpuru at the helm. Eléxpuru, a dropout architecture student, had
begun at Clarín in 1955 as a cartoonist and graphic designer. His creative
and organizational talents took him to the top ﬁrst of Clarín, and then of
Alas, in record time. JWT CEO Don Johnson entrusted Eléxpuru with
putting its ﬁrst team together, a team that remained remarkably stable
through the years, in contrast to the high turnover of the rest of the
staff. Eléxpuru’s closest collaborator was Julián Bravo. After studying
law and business at the University of Madrid, Bravo worked for the
Spanish-American agency Publinsa, Kenyon & Eckhardt, where he
learned on the job and was offered the opportunity to spend a year in
New York.53 Like Ruescas ﬁfteen years earlier, Bravo became an
engaged disseminator of American-style marketing and advertising in
professional and academic areas. He would go on to be a proliﬁc writer
and effective institutional entrepreneur in his ﬁeld. Within JWT Spain,
Bravo developed programs of in-house training, work by objectives,
and an exchange program that allowed employees to spend time in any
of JWT’s foreign branches. Last but not least, he built an outstanding
professional team.
51 Sam Meek Papers, Madrid, correspondence, 13 Mar. 1961, JWTA.
52 Francisco García Ruescas, Historia de la publicidad en España (Madrid, 1971);
Francisco García Ruescas, Relatos al ﬁnal del camino (Madrid, 1995).
53 Clemente Ferrer Rosello, Los gurús de la publicidad (Madrid, 1996); Fernando
Montañés, Una historia de la publicidad y el consumidor en España (Madrid, 2014).
Núria Puig and Adoración Álvaro-Moya / 438
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007680518000764
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universidad Complutense de Madrid Biblioteca, on 04 Apr 2019 at 08:09:09, subject to the
By the time JWT established its own subsidiary in Spain, the com-
pany’s other European ofﬁces, active since the immediate post–World
War II period, had learned to creatively adapt their New York–made
portfolios to the characteristics of local markets. However, research
remained the agency’s blueprint, and our study shows that the reputa-
tion of the Spanish ofﬁce relied on and would continue to rely on its thor-
ough methodology, even if a growing number of agencies had already
adopted similar methods. In any case, JWT remained a trendsetter. It
released yearly analyses of socioeconomic indicators and pioneered in-
house training of personnel. More than anything else, this strategy
helped to disseminate JWT’s methods and style within the Spanish
advertising industry. Our research reveals that JWT Spain’s clients
remained strikingly loyal. American multinationals continued to be its
most important clients, but in the 1970s a number of Spanish corpora-
tions would join the roster as well.
Indeed, JWT Spain grew exponentially between 1966 and 1980, and
the number of employees rose from 22 to 108.54 This growth was char-
acterized by high turnover rates at the lower andmiddle levels and stabil-
ity at the top. The good results of the Spanish ofﬁce, stated in the
ﬂattering reports written by Denis Lanigan, the JWT European director,
explain why Eléxpuru’s team increased both their autonomy and inﬂu-
ence within JWT’s international organization. In 1974, the two American
directors, Lee Pavao and Bill Peniche, who had supervised the Spanish
subsidiary, were replaced by Spanish managers. Eléxpuru and Bravo
were appointed chairman of the board of directors and CEO, respec-
tively, and in 1980 the number of Spanish partners rose to fourteen.
Two years later, the board of directors became all-Spanish as well, and
Eléxpuru was appointed executive vice president of JWT Worldwide.
In spite of the relatively small size of JWT Spain, its inﬂuence on the
Spanish advertising industry was remarkable. Between 1963 and 1980,
according to our estimates, there were around two hundred profes-
sionals working for JWT Spain. Further, our research on the individual
careers of almost thirty local directors conﬁrms that the institutional
and educational involvement by these approximately two hundred pro-
fessionals left its mark on this creative industry.
Merck Sharp & Dohme, 1949–1978
The world pharmaceutical industry underwent dramatic changes
after World War II. Not only did wartime cooperation between govern-
ments and private ﬁrms produce major innovations (such as penicillin
54 JWT, J. Walter Thompson España.
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manufactured on an industrial scale), but it paved the way for changing
the rules of the game under U.S. leadership; speciﬁcally, the cartelized
structure of prewar industry was replaced by an emerging technological
market in which patents, licenses, and technical assistance could be
traded freely at decreasing prices.55 One of the founders of the modern
antibiotics industry and the postwar architecture of pharmaceutical
research and manufacturing was MSD, headquartered in Rahway, New
Jersey. It should be noted that Merck & Co. and its customer for ﬁne
chemicals Sharp & Dohme merged in 1953.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Spanish pharmaceutical market became
one of the ten largest markets in the world.56 Despite the nationalistic
mindset of General Franco’s early governments, the spectacular develop-
ment of this postwar industry took place without interference from the
government or competition from state-owned ﬁrms and with the assis-
tance of foreign, particularly American, companies. A law passed in
1948 established a private duopoly in the emerging antibiotics industry:
Compañía Española de Penicilina y Antibióticos (CEPA) and Antibióti-
cos SA.57 Both ﬁrms were granted ﬁscal and administrative privileges
and the exclusive right to sell in the domestic market. We focus here
on CEPA, founded in 1949 by the Spanish business group Urquijo with
the technical assistance of Merck & Co. (MSD after 1953). Like Antibió-
ticos, CEPA became one of the largest Spanish pharmaceutical ﬁrms in
terms of capital and employees, strengthening its ties with the Universi-
ties of Madrid and Barcelona, and promoting an organized defense of
Spain’s pharmaceutical industry.58 Many of the scientists involved in
the research and manufacture of antibiotics in Spain were already
familiar with American institutions. Between 1919 and 1936, the
Rockefeller Foundation had provided support to the country’s public
health system.59 After 1958, ties between American and Spanish
medical schools would be reinforced through the Spanish Fulbright
program, which was strongly focused on the life sciences.
55Núria Puig,Constructores de la químicamoderna: Bayer, Cepsa, Puig, Repsol, Schering
y La Seda (Madrid, 2003), chap. 4; Núria Puig, “Networks of Innovation or Networks of
Opportunity? The Making of the Spanish Antibiotics Industry,” Ambix 51, no. 2 (2004):
167–85.
56 Puig, Constructores, chap. 4; Puig, “Networks of Innovation”; Núria Puig, “Networks of
Opportunity and the Spanish Pharmaceutical Industry,” in Innovation and Networks in
Europe, ed. Paloma Fernández and Mary Rose (London, 2010), 164–83.
57 Puig, “Networks of Innovation”.
58María Jesús Santesmases, Antibióticos en la autarquía: banca privada, industria far-
macéutica, investigación cientíﬁca y cultura liberal en España, 1940–1960 (Madrid, 1999).
59 Esteban Rodríguez-Ocaña, “La intervención de la Fundación Rockefeller en la creación
de la sanidad contemporánea en España,” Revista Española de Salud Pública 74 (2000):
27–34.
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As shown in Table 1, the introduction of MSD in Spain took place in
ﬁve steps. The ﬁrst was a technical andmanufacturing agreement in 1949
between CEPA—represented by the brilliant scientist Antonio Gallego—
and Merck & Co.60 This agreement was renewed and expanded in 1951
and 1955. CEPA’s strategy of matching MSD’s interests (reaching the
Spanish market, selling raw materials, and cashing and repatriating roy-
alties and dividends) to Spain’s ofﬁcial requirements (saving dollars,
minimizing royalties, and retaining dividends at home) consisted of
paying royalties and dividends on MSD’s planned investments and raw
materials.
The story of CEPA is closely linked to the pharmachemical complex
built by Urquijo Group. After World War II, the group would go on to
acquire many expropriated German ﬁrms, playing a remarkable role in
Spain’s economic/diplomatic relations with the United States and
becoming the voice of the Ford Foundation in Spain.61 One of the
leading expropriated German ﬁrms, Schering, became the foundation
of CEPA, directed by Gallego. He had been hired through his brother
José Luis, the scientiﬁc director of Bayer, which was also expropriated,
in Spain. Schering’s excellent sales network was used to commercialize
the ﬁrst antibiotics manufactured by CEPA under MSD’s license, and
the rising proﬁts of Schering itself kept CEPA going during its difﬁcult
beginning. Moreover, Bayer and Schering ﬁnanced one of the few
private scientiﬁc institutions of the time, the Instituto Español de Far-
macología (IFE), founded in 1950 at the University of Madrid.
The IFE’s contribution to the second step is the Natural Products
Screening Program, which is the origin of MSD’s research center in
Madrid (Centro de Investigación Básica Española [CIBE]) and an
extremely interesting piece of the scientiﬁc-academic puzzle constructed
by Gallego in postwar Spain.62 In 1954, he persuadedMSD to establish a
branch of the newly launched screening program to identify natural
active ingredients that were later synthesized in the United States. The
modest research unit focused on the continued work of Dr. Martínez
60 Industria, box 5112, folder 37Q, Archivo General de la Administración [General admin-
istration archives], Madrid, Spain (hereafter, AGA).
61Núria Puig and Adoración Álvaro-Moya, “La guerra fría y los empresarios españoles: la
articulación de los intereses económicos de Estados Unidos en España, 1950–1975,”Revista de
Historia Económica 22, no. 2 (2004): 413–14; Núria Puig and Adoración Álvaro-Moya,
“Misión imposible: la expropiación de las empresas alemanas en España, 1945–1975,”
Investigaciones de Historia Económica 7 (2007): 103–32; Puig and Torres, Banco Urquijo,
196–201.
62 Jeffrey Sturchio, Values and Visions: A Merck Century (Rahway, N.J., 1992); Sagrario
Mochales, “Forty Years of Screening Programmes for Antibiotics,” Microbiología 10, no. 4
(1994): 331–42; W. R. Strohl, H. B. Woodruff, R. L. Monaghan, D. Hendlin, S. Mochales,
A. L. Demain, and J. Liesch, “The History of Natural Products Research at Merck & Co.,
Inc.,” SIM News 51, no. 1 (2001): 5–19.
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Mata and his small team of fourteen people, most of whom were trained
and supervised by MSD at Rahway or Madrid. According to Sagrario
Mochales, who started as an intern in 1954 and ended up heading this
research center from 1988 to 1998, the relationship between Rahway
and Madrid was excellent, and the meager salaries (paid by CEPA) did
not dampen the enthusiasm of its members.63 Joining the screening
program at such an early stagemeant having an overview of how this pio-
neering ﬁrm planned its research—an opportunity that few foreign ﬁrms
had previously offered Spanish researchers. Gallego’s persuasive nature
and his personal relationship with Oswald Stapley, MSD’s program
director, help explain why the American ﬁrm, whose few foreign research
units were located in highly developed countries, accepted the Spanish
proposal.
How inﬂuential was the screening program on the scientiﬁc and
industrial fabric of Spain? According to Mochales and Isabel Martín
(a student of Gallego’s who had a lifelong career at CIBE), the program
cannot be separated from the larger IFE, where most of the recruitment
and training of young researchers was done. Both scientists note that,
despite Gallego’s efforts, the worlds of the Institute and the screening
program remained outside Spanish academia. Indeed, the industry-
minded researchers working within this unique post–World War II
arrangement were regarded with suspicion by their academic peers. Con-
sequently, most of the thirty university graduates who worked for the
screening program between 1954 and 1978 would spend their careers
in the research departments of MSD and other multinational
laboratories.
The third step was a 1957 agreement for the distribution of MSD’s
products by CEPA.64 This strategy was common among multinational
ﬁrms seeking to avoid the many obstacles imposed by the Spanish
administration on foreign investment and the commercialization of
foreign drugs before 1960. CEPA’s records reveal a substantial increase
in sales, proﬁts, and staff in the ensuing years.65 However, there is no evi-
dence that MSD inﬂuenced CEPA’s commercial department or sales
force in any notable way.
Over time, the Urquijo pharmachemical complex could not satisfy
the expectations of its creators. Falling international prices of raw mate-
rials and some active ingredients, the gradual liberalization of the
63 Sagrario Mochales, interview by Núria Puig, 27 June 2001, Madrid. Isabel Martín,
Fernando Peláez, and Paloma Fernández-Cano—all senior researchers at CIBE—were also
interviewed, 24 Sept., 2 Oct., and 12 Nov. 2001.
64 Industria, box 5112, folder 37Q, AGA.
65 CEPA Annual Reports, 1958–1968, Fundación Juan March, Fondo Banco Urquijo,
Madrid, Spain (hereafter, FHBU).
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Spanish economy after 1960, the inexorable advent of petrochemicals,
and the approaching expiration of its licensing contracts with Germany
combined to bring down the entire structure. As a result, in 1974
CEPA was sold to the Spanish conglomerate Explosivos Río Tinto. The
new management fostered backward integration and the acquisition of
other Spanish ﬁrms. As for the screening program, Explosivos did not
seem impressed by its scientiﬁc achievements (centered on four new
antibiotics patented in the United States between 1972 and 1976).66
Understandably, when the opportunity arose in 1978, Martínez Mata
and his collaborators moved over to MSD’s new manufacturing subsidi-
ary in Madrid.
The forces that harmed CEPA’s growth seemed to encourage MSD’s
independent plans in Spain. Taking advantage of the Spanish govern-
ment’s more liberal policies in the next decade and the expanding
domestic market, a commercial subsidiary was established in 1968 on
the outskirts of Madrid.67 This was the fourth step, well documented
in the Spanish National Archives.68 In its application, MSD argued
that it had cooperated with CEPA in the development of new antibiotics
since the foundation of the Spanish ﬁrm. Clinical testing was then on the
rise in the context of the post-thalidomide shock, which resulted in
stricter regulations as well as much longer and more costly processes
for the development of new drugs. American laboratories had pioneered
the institutionalization of clinical research, then nonexistent in Spain.
MSD looked for someone to direct a pioneering clinical testing unit in
Madrid and chose Joaquín Mouriz, a medical researcher with wide post-
doctoral experience in the United States, sending him to Rahway for
more specialized training.69 In collaboration with the University of
Navarra, MSD helped to create Spain’s ﬁrst clinical pharmacological
department, providing the Spanish university with regular funding and
launching a competitive biomedical program.
The ﬁfth step was taken in 1978: MSD was granted authorization to
build a manufacturing plant in Alcalá de Henares, Madrid.70 By then the
staff of themultinational ﬁrm had risen from 42 to 324 (including only 21
university graduates), 16 of whomwere expatriates. The CEO and quality
control director were Spaniards. By that time, MSD had built an exten-
sive clinical research network with the Universities of Navarra and Bar-
celona (Autonomous), Spain’s main national research body (Consejo
66Mochales, “Forty Years of Screening Programmes”; Strohl et al., “History of Natural
Products Research.”
67 Industria, box 5112, folder 37Q, AGA.
68 Industria, box 322, AGA.
69 Industria, box 286, AGA.
70 Industria, boxes 291, 292, and 293, AGA.
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Superior de Investigaciones Cientíﬁcas), and Spain’s leading military
hospital. The list of MSD’s scientiﬁc collaborators suggests that the
American ﬁrm knew how to recruit talented and loyal scientists.
Under the lead of Mouriz, MSD introduced clinical testing into the
Spanish medical system, granted scholarships to promising Spanish
doctors and medical researchers (forty-four such scholarships between
1968 and 1977), provided active ingredients and drugs to Spanish hospi-
tals and researchers, and cooperated with the local pharmaceutical
industry through CEPA.
The case of MSD, therefore, illustrates how MNEs’ knowledge
spreads beyond subsidiaries through training and research agreements
between ﬁrms and universities. In that process, having proper domestic
institutions certainly matters, as does having local staff familiar with the
domestic educational and science context. And it is in this environment
that business groups, such as Urquijo, can emerge as key talent pools.
John Deere, 1956–1970s
The widespread mechanization of agriculture dates from the 1950s
in most Western countries.71 By that time, the market was dominated
by a handful of U.S. multinationals, one, Deere & Co., commonly
known as John Deere (JD), being at the top.72 Compared with other
American manufacturers, JD went international quite late when in
1956 it acquired the well-regarded, but declining, German manufacturer
Heinrich Lanz. An in-depth reorganization of the company’s structure, to
support global expansion and focus on marketing activities followed.
This strategy, however, proved to be insufﬁcient to cope with saturation
in Western markets in the 1960s. JD and global manufacturers then
looked to the expanding markets of Latin America, Southern Africa,
and Southern Europe, where governments granted niche markets to
those foreign companies committed to increasing domestic content in
foreign-controlled assembly plants.
This was also the case for Spain, a country in which JD inherited a
factory in Madrid owned by Lanz as part of a joint venture with some
local partners (Table 1). The U.S. multinational did not begin to reorga-
nize its new European afﬁliates and subsidiaries, including the one in
71Giovanni Federico, Feeding the World: An Economic History of Agriculture, 1800–
2000 (Princeton, 2005).
72 Robert T. Kurdle, Agricultural Tractors: A World Industry Study (Cambridge, Mass.,
1975); Pascal Bye and Jean-Jacques Chanaron, The Agricultural Machinery Industry in the
1980s: Factors and International Cooperation (Vienna, 1983); Wayne G. Broehl Jr., John
Deere’s Company: A History of Deere & Company and Its Times (New York, 1984), appendix,
exhibit 2.2.
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Spain, until 1959.73 JD then undertook a comprehensive two-year
program of adapting foreign subsidiaries to the manufacture of John
Deere products, as well as to the multinational’s corporate culture,
global strategy, day-to-day management, and quality standards. In
Spain, JD had to also adapt the former Lanz factory to the production
of engines and other elements to meet the government’s request to
increase the amount of local content.74 The intelligent adaptation of
the American models to the needs of Spanish farmers and the changes
introduced in both manufacturing and marketing placed the Spanish
subsidiary among the three largest manufacturers in the country since
the early 1960s. At the same time, factory facilities were expanded and
JD’s participation capital in the subsidiary rose to full ownership in
1970, when the subsidiary was renamed John Deere Ibérica (JDI).
The ﬁrst step to transforming the Spanish subsidiary was training
the local top and middle managers in John Deere’s business methods,
marketing strategies, and accounting practices.75 This employed a
great novelty, management training (both on the job and in higher edu-
cation) which was still uncommon in Spain.76 Here, American interests
coincided with the Spanish drive for productivity, which, supported by
the state and again inspired by U.S. technical assistance, had been
trying for some years to extend middle-management training among
Spanish ﬁrms. In the case of JDI, training was handled exclusively by
the American multinational.
The arrival of the American executives meant a complete transfor-
mation of the work done on the shop ﬂoor. As in many other large
Spanish ﬁrms at that time, rationalization and scientiﬁc management
methods became the rule.77 Safety and security standards were also
73 Broehl, John Deere’s Company, 648–53.
74 JDI, 1970 Annual Report, FHBU; Silvia Nieto, John Deere Ibérica, 50 años juntos: His-
toria de un líder (Madrid, 2003), 64–65.
75 Based on JDI, Annual Reports (1959–1970), FHBU; Minutes of the Comité de Empresa
[Works council] 1965–1974, Archivo Histórico de Comisiones Obreras [Comisiones Obreras’
Archives], Madrid, Spain (hereafter AHCCOO); “Acuerdo sobre la nueva organización de
primas e incentivos del personal obrero de Lanz Ibérica, S.A.,” 16 Mar. 1964, 02/32,
AHCCOO; Report from Francis Lardner (John Deere’s delegate in Spain), 15 Mar. 1965, 10/
28, AHCCOO; Letter from labor representative at the Jurado de Empresa, 20 Dec. 1969, 3/
11, AHCCOO. Ricardo Medem (former president and honorary chairman of JDI) and Luis
Sánchez (former general manager and vice chairman of JDI), interview by Adoración
Álvaro-Moya, 14 Oct. 2005. Comisiones Obreras is one of the largest Spanish trade unions, for-
merly attached to the Spanish Communist Party.
76Núria Puig, “Educating Spanish Managers: The United States, Modernising Networks,
and Business Schools in Spain, 1950–1975,” in Inside the Business Schools: The Content of
European Business Education, ed. Rolv Petter Amdam, Ragnhild Kvälshaugen, and Eirinn
Larsen (Oslo, 2003), 58–86.
77Mauro F. Guillén, Models of Management: Work, Authority, and Organization in a
Comparative Perspective (Chicago, 1994), chap. 4.
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developed, as well as a strict system of quality control, ﬁrst for the com-
ponents purchased from other suppliers, and later for those manufac-
tured at the factory.78 This process of transformation was coordinated
by the new department of industrial organization, which was also in
charge of employee training and was entirely constituted of engineers
from the subsidiary.79 As a result, the number of engineers at the ﬁrm
increased at the same time that new scientiﬁc management experts
were appointed. Skilled Spanish technical employees rose from 32 in
1955 (7.8 percent of total staff) to 101 (11 percent) in 1967.80 Spanish
engineers adapted the American models to the speciﬁc demands of
Spanish farmers, particularly in vineyards and orchards.
JDI also radically transformed its existing sales network. The ﬁrst
step in this direction came in 1961 with a commercial joint venture
with the Medem family, a close partner since the times of Lanz and
until then in charge of commercializing John Deere products.81 The
Spanish partners provided knowledge of and long experience with the
domestic market, while the Americans supplied the ﬁnancial resources
needed to consolidate the network and develop credit lines for future
purchasers. The company’s existing sales branches were transformed
into a network of exclusive, independent dealerships, which were also
responsible for after-sales service and the relatively new secondhand
market.82 In 1969, John Deere had nearly a hundred dealers, covering
the entire Spanish territory, and a new system of commercialization
that was quickly imitated by competitors. JDI’s sales division was
accordingly reorganized, creating regional units to cope with this new
dealer network. The individual units were supervised by a regional
manager and a technical expert.
Each dealership comprised, at minimum, a general manager, a trav-
eling sales representative, a salesmanager, and technical assistance staff.
Traveling sales personnel, who were not contracted on a commission
basis, were required to give detailed daily reports on their operations
as well as those of their competitors. They were, in fact, the main
source of information about the needs of farmers. Mechanical staff,
who were periodically trained at the Spanish headquarters, were pro-
vided with both technical training and manuals. JD also gave detailed
78Nieto, John Deere, 57–58.
79 “Acuerdo sobre,” AHCCOO.
80 Industria, reference (13)1.06 71/6411, AGA; JDI, Reglamento de régimen interior
(Madrid, 1968).
81 Industria, reference (13)1.06 71/6940, ﬁle 68371, AGA.
82 JDI, Annual Reports, 1969–1972, FHBU; JDI, Profesionalismo John Deere (Madrid,
1966); Ricardo Medem, Formación y desarrollo: Discurso a los estudiantes de la Escuela
Técnica Superior de Ingenieros Agrónomos de Madrid, el día 19 de febrero de 1969
(Madrid, 1969).
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instructions to general managers about how tomanage the ﬁrm, in terms
of accounting, stock control, advertising, ﬁnancial policy, depot and
showroom organization, and how to deal with employees.
The transformation was led by two expatriates in charge of plant
organization and sales (Jim Lardner and Robert Hanson) and three
local engineers (Ricardo Medem, Luis Sánchez Sanz de Madrid, and
José Ramón Escudero).83 Our analysis of their professional careers
shows that, in particular, in the case of Ricardo Medem, they had exten-
sive experience abroad, enjoyed training from internships in JD’s head-
quarters and European subsidiaries, and collaborated frequently with
local business and engineering schools.
JD internationalized late and in a context of high international com-
petition in a mature market. It followed a strategy of gradual adaptation
to new markets, taking some years to fully adapt foreign subsidiaries
to the company’s standards. In Spain this adaptation was strictly
guided by headquarters, to quickly train local managers who were able
to fully develop a business model that spread across the industry.
These managers would later be able to participate in the global restruc-
turing that JD, like other major manufacturers, had to cope with in the
1980s.
Conclusion
In this article we have explored the long-term effects of FDI on the
human capital development of host economies through a multiple-case
analysis that integrates both local-context variables and corporate deci-
sions on entry mode and training strategies. We have focused on the
hiring and training of top technical and managerial personnel in four
leading U.S. multinationals that, for different periods of twentieth-
century Spain, established lasting relationships with local companies
and reached dominant positions in the Spanish market. Our research
examines a speciﬁc type of human capital, one that is embodied in man-
agerial and technical personnel and that is at the core of the modern
business enterprise. The cases selected encompass a wide range of indus-
tries, so human resource development took on different dimensions, but
there are ﬁve major conclusions that apply to the four of them.
First, the recruitment of technical and organizational talent ran
rather smoothly. Expatriates, although crucial in the early stages,
tended to be replaced by Spanish-educated managers. Why? We have
identiﬁed three main drivers. Spanish economic nationalism certainly
83Nieto, Cincuenta años, 56, 66–68; Medem, Formación y desarrollo; and sources in
note 75.
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encouraged such practices. But the implementation of adaptive strate-
gies by American multinationals after World War II and the availability
of either experienced or promising Spain-based professionals played a
signiﬁcant role as well. It should be noted that highly skilled positions
required educational backgrounds that ranged from telecom and indus-
trial engineering (ITT and JD) to chemistry and pharmacology (MSD)
and social sciences (JWT). The availability of Spanish professionals
across these ﬁelds was uneven. While engineering schools were ﬁrmly
established in nineteenth-century Spain and the study of medicine
and natural sciences experienced remarkable development in the ﬁrst
decades of the twentieth century, business and marketing studies were
not formally taught until the late 1950s, when the dominant role of
U.S. production and marketing techniques fueled the formal teaching
of business and marketing studies.84 In-house formal and informal
training were, therefore, crucial to adapting technical knowledge to
conform with modern business practices and international standards.
Not surprisingly, expatriates sought to enhance marketing and sales
and their inﬂuence was felt across the entire business spectrum.
Although our research does not focus onMNE stafﬁng strategies, the
empirical evidence provided here suggests that expatriates in topmanag-
ing positions were key to a smooth transfer of the companies’ corporate
culture and expertise, as noted in the mainstream stafﬁng literature.85
The local institutional context and the availability of local qualiﬁed
labor shaped each subsidiary’s policies, apart from the company’s
global guidelines on international human resources. Business historians
have long argued thatMNEs used expatriates to ﬁll positions and control
subsidiaries, while nationals were appointed to reduce technical, eco-
nomic, and political risks in host countries.86 In the four cases studied,
top local personnel had at least some international experience, which
helped create relationships with the multinationals’ expatriates built
on understanding and trust. But we still know little about companies’
stafﬁng strategies, or their corporate and environmental determinants.
We have only scattered information, in fact, about our companies’
84 Puig and Álvaro-Moya, “La guerra fría.”
85 Anders Edström and Jay R. Galbraith, “Transfer of Managers as a Coordination and
Control Strategy in Multinational Organizations,” Administrative Science Quarterly 22, no.
2 (1977): 248–63; Anne-Wil Harzing, “Who’s In Charge? An Empirical Study of Executive
Stafﬁng Practices in Foreign Subsidiaries,” Human Resource Management 40, no. 2 (2001):
139–58.
86Wilkins, Maturing of Multinational Enterprise, 159–60; Jones, Multinationals and
Global Capitalism, chap. 7; Rory M. Miller, “Stafﬁng and Management in British MNEs in
Argentina and Chile, 1930–1970,” in The Impact of Globalization on Argentina and Chile:
Business Enterprises and Entrepreneurship, ed. Geoffrey Jones and Andrea Lluch (Chelten-
ham, 2015), 152–81.
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international stafﬁng strategies, whichmakes it difﬁcult to draw compar-
isons across subsidiaries in different countries. Some of Telefónica’s
strategies were replicated in other countries.87 Lack of resources, includ-
ing personnel, also explains why JD did not employ expat American
managers to run subsidiaries abroad in its ﬁrst years of internationaliza-
tion. The ﬁrst senior executive to be stationed overseas was not
appointed until 1966.88
Second, we have stated that anMNE’s entry strategy played a signiﬁ-
cant role in each case. Rising economic nationalism in mid-twentieth-
century Spain prompted U.S. ﬁrms to establish lasting investments
(wholly owned subsidiaries, joint ventures, and alliances) in which Span-
iards’ capital participation differed in percentage, but nonetheless
empowered local partners, increased the number and rank of Spanish
employees and directors, accelerated the transfer of technology,
favored the development of some projects that were not on the
agendas of these American multinationals, and led to highly rewarding
settlements when the U.S. ﬁrms were ﬁnally allowed to establish full sub-
sidiaries in Spain. Furthermore, local partners facilitated the foundation
of wholly owned subsidiaries, even in strategic sectors such as telecom-
munications, in the midst of the rise of nationalism. Spanish partners
were crucial to ensuring control afterward, as they helped foreign
ﬁrms not only gain access to local social and political networks, but
also beneﬁt from government subsidies and tariff protection.
Third, our research shows that the upgrading of local capabilities
was a two-way process. American multinationals were able to engage
and train host-nation personnel. But Spanish partners did not act
merely as gatekeepers, exchanging their local contacts and knowledge
for comparatively high salaries and dividends, but in fact managed to
bring their own research and manufacturing plans forward. The initia-
tives and persuasiveness of professionals around Urquijo Group
explain the early Spanish operations of ITT and MSD, not the other
way around. Similarly, the Medem family would play a leading role in
some of JD’s projects. Under restrictive legal requirements, local part-
ners also promoted linkages with local ﬁrms, as observed in MSD’s,
JD’s, and ITT’smanufacturing branches. This suggests that strategic alli-
ances served not just to avoid the liability of outsidership but to enhance
MNEs’ direct effects and spillovers.89
87Marcelo Bucheli and Erica Salvaj, “Reputation and Political Legitimacy: ITT in Chile,
1927–1972,” Business History Review 87, no. 4 (2013): 729–56; Deloraine, Telecom and ITT.
88 Broehl, John Deere’s Company, 619, 679.
89 Jan Johanson and Jan E. Vahlne, “The Uppsala Internationalization Process Model
Revisited: From Liability of Foreignness to Liability of Outsidership,” Journal of International
Business Studies 40, no. 9 (2009): 1411–31.
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Recent studies on technological transfer and capabilities upgrading
in late developing economies such as South Korea and Taiwan, or even
Japan after World War II, show that governmental research strategies
can be decisive.90 By encouraging licensing agreements, higher educa-
tion, and R&D, governments in those countries promoted the develop-
ment of indigenous technical and managerial skills and limited the
inﬂuence of foreign ﬁrms. Does this apply to mid-twentieth-century
Spain? While it is true that the government invested in education and
promoted licensing and technical-assistance agreements, scarce
resources were used to promote domestic R&D.91 This explains the
lack of qualiﬁed professionals and the limited domestic technological
development. Both encouraged inward FDI-led growth in many indus-
tries as well as joint ventures. That was also true for concessions, as illus-
trated by the case of ITT. The preference for strategic alliances has also
been observed for other countries of the European periphery, such as
Italy and Portugal, particularly after World War II.92
Fourth, the stories of ITT and MSD reveal that business groups
might act as catalysts for both local human capital and foreign capital
and technology, as the literature on business groups in late industrializ-
ing countries shows.93 The Urquijo Group mobilized contacts and
managerial and technical professionals, while its foreign partners con-
tributed the capital and technology needed to enter new and promising
industries. By contrast, the stories of JWT (after 1949) and JD indicate
that American ﬁrms were able to hire large numbers of independent
qualiﬁed professionals who were crucial in implementing the produc-
tion, marketing, and organizational techniques and corporate culture
90Alice Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (Oxford,
1992); Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking away the Ladder (New York, 2002); Dani Rodrik, One Eco-
nomics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth (Princeton, N.J.,
2008); Mauro F. Guillén and Esteban García-Canal, The New Multinationals: Spanish
Firms in a Global Context (Cambridge, U.K., 2012).
91Mar Cebrián, “La regulación industrial y la transferencia internacional de tecnología en
España (1959–1973),” Investigaciones de historia económica 3 (2005): 11–40; Antonio
Hidalgo, José Molero, and Gerardo Penas, “Technology and industrialization at the take-off
of the Spanish economy: New evidence based on patents,” World Patent Information 32,
no. 1 (2010): 53–61.
92 Colli, “Multinationals and Economic Development”; Teresa da Silva Lopes and Vitor
C. Simoes, “Foreign Investment in Portugal and Knowledge Spillovers: From the Methuen
Treaty to the 21st Century,” Business History (advance online publication 20 Nov. 2017),
https://doi.org/10.1080/00076791.2017.1386177; Valerio Cerretano, “Multinational Business
and Host Countries in Times of Crisis: Courtaulds, Glanzstoff, and Italy in the Interwar
Period,” Economic History Review 71, no. 2 (2018): 540–66.
93 Asli Colpan and Takashi Hikino, “Foundations of Business Groups: Toward an Inte-
grated Framework,” in The Oxford Handbook of Business Groups, ed. Asli M. Colpan,
Takashi Hikino, and James R. Lincoln (Oxford, 2010), 15–66; and María Inés Barbero and
Núria Puig, “Business Groups around the World: An Introduction,” Business History 58,
no. 1 (2016): 6–29.
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of the MNE. In turn, Spanish professionals saw the opportunity to
work for a leading ﬁrm and so became very involved, as exempliﬁed by
Gallego’s and Eléxpuru’s teams at MSD and JWT, respectively. Our
research, therefore, shows a spectrum of local partners and businesses
that is broader than the one identiﬁed in the business group literature.
Our ﬁfth conclusion deals with the spillovers of FDI. Our study of
over one hundred professionals linked to the Spanish operations of
four U.S. multinational ﬁrms provides substantive evidence on the dis-
semination of technical and organizational knowledge within their sub-
sidiaries through, more or less, institutionalized in-house training and
personnel exchange programs. Knowledge was spread beyond the sub-
sidiaries and joint ventures by those professionals who moved on to
other companies and to educational and scientiﬁc institutions (more fre-
quently at JWT and MSD), by directors who taught at Spanish universi-
ties and professional schools, and by those who helped to create or
support professional and educational institutions in their respective
ﬁelds. The most visible case is JWT. The agency became an incubator
for Spanish advertising, setting trends, providing in-house training for
around three hundred people, associating with proliﬁc disseminators
of knowledge (such as Ruescas and Bravo), sponsoring yearly surveys,
and professionalizing advertising.
Our research suggests that, given the proper institutional support
and human-capital development, hosting multinationals is more favor-
able than excluding them in terms of knowledge transfer and domestic
growth. This is the opposite of what has been argued for developing
countries.94 But early twentieth-century Spain was certainly in a better
position in terms of human capital (in a broad sense), entrepreneurship,
and enforcement rights than other developing countries in Latin
America, Africa, or Asia. Furthermore, our study is biased in the sense
that the Spanish headquarters of the four American MNEs analyzed
here were located in Madrid, one of the most developed regions in the
country. Together with Catalonia (Barcelona, above all) and the
Basque Country, the Madrid region presents, since the early twentieth
century, better ﬁgures than the country average in terms of literacy
and labor productivity.95 These four U.S. companies operated at a
national scale, but they developed long ties to educational institutions
in the area of Madrid, where MNEs’ headquarters were located and
their top managers worked. Foreign companies did not aim to change,
or to reinforce, existing institutions—another of the traditional debates
94 Jones, “Business History and the Impact.”
95 Santiago Zapata, “Apéndice estadístico,” in Historia regional de España, ed. Luis
Germán, Enrique Llopis, Jordi Maluquer de Motes, and Santiago Zapata (Barcelona, 2001),
571, 573, and 591.
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on FDI spillovers, but their ties with local educational institutions was
the result of an adaptation strategy and, we argue, of the empowerment
of local staff.
Finally, had the four American ﬁrms been able to establish full sub-
sidiaries from the start, their impact in terms of business opportunities
(and proﬁts) and development of managerial and technical capabilities
would probably have been more limited. To build on this counterfactual,
future research should explore the operations of the four American
MNEs in other countries. Our single-country, multiple-case study pro-
vides a solid empirical base for understanding the cross-fertilization
process that multinational ﬁrms trigger in their host economies.
Despite the spectacular growth of international business scholarship in
recent decades, the long-term effects of FDI on the host institutional
and organizational settings remain relatively underexplored and misun-
derstood.96 This article has shown that a long-term perspective and a
focus on managerial and technical professional development are fertile
grounds on which to assess those effects.
. . .
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